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LIBERALISM IN RETREAT: 
THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT, 1945-1952 
The twenty-year presence of liberal Democratic administra,.. 
tions "from 193 3  to 1953 has stimulated a prevailing interpretation 
that the period represented basically continuity in domestic policy. 
The usual assumption ha's been that the Truman administration did 
much to institutionalize the New Deal and that the Fair Deal, d.flspite 
a recalcitrant Congress, managed some modest extensions of the 
Roosevelt legacy, One of the reasons for this interpretation, which 
appears regardless of ideological positions, is that historians have 
focused chiefly on social-welfare legislation; they have thus neglected 
many of the other innovative contributions of the New Deal, and have 
all but ignored the manner in which succeeding regimes administered 
1 New Deal measures. 
In this paper I propose to test this prevailing interpretation 
of the continuity of liberalism from New Deal to Fair Deal by 
analyzing some of the major issues facing the Interior Department 
from 1945 to 1952 . In so doing I hope to illuminate some neglected 
issues and to suggest alternative interpretations of others., The 
Department of the Interior seems to me to be a particularly suitable 
Interior - 2 
vehicle for a case study of Truman-era liberalism. The department 
embraced a more diverse array of programs than any other 
department; this diversity, coupled with the strength of the depart­
ment during the Roosevelt years, made it an unusually full expression 
of the New Deal's many facets. Moreover, the continuity of 
leadership in the department from New Deal to Fair Deal made it 
seem the embodiment of the liberal tradition. Secretary Harold L. 
Ickes served until February 15, 1946,  affording an unusual opportunity 
to watch an old New Dealer orient his department to the problems of 
the postwar. Oscar L. ·Chapman, who served as secretary from 
December 1, 1949, to January 20, 1953, had been assistant secretary 
for thirteen years under Ickes and under secretary from 1946 to 1949. 
Chapman's unusual tenure made him. appear to contemporary 
liberal observers as 11one of the few authentic New Dealers left in 
the Cabinet. 11
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To understand the varying positions of the Interior 
Department, I want to sketch briefly the public philosophies of the 
three secretaries of the period 1933-1953 with an eye toward their 
distinctive approaches. Secretary Ickes maintained a balanced 
approach between conservation for use and conservation for preserva­
tion. On the one hand he strengthened the department's developmental 
capabilities, particularly public-power activities. On the other, he 
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created three wilderness parks (Kings Canyon, Olympic, and 
Everglades), set aside other wilderness areas, and displayed firm 
resistance to anything that impaired the national parks' inviolability. 
He encouraged valley authorities for river-basin development and 
comprehensive planning -- under his jurisdiction, to be sure. 11The 
old curmudgeon" also retained an old progressive's suspicion of 
private interests, especially big oil companies and big ranchers, 
who wanted to exploit the public domain for their own advantage, 
The balanced conservation impulse is, as Otis Graham has remarked, 
"so nourishing to the impulse to see things in their total web of 
relationships" and thus encouraged an organic view of society. This 
outlook carried over into policy towards dependent peoples, 
particularly Indians, where Ickes supported the Indian New Deal's 
fostering of .Indian identity and community. President Roosevelt 
shared much of this organic sense, and his support of Ickes' programs 
'proved indispensable. 3 
When Ickes fell out of the Truman cabinet in February 1946 
in a celebrated dispute over the nomination of oil man Ed Pauley to
be under secretary of the navy, the New Deal was delivered into 
the hands of Julius A. "Cap" Krug, A Milwaukee-born electric-
power engineer, Krug was a protege of Bernard Baruch and David 
Lilienthal and had served as chairman of the War Production Board. 
Krug1s public philosophy w as hard to discern; he was esentially a 
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technocrat with mildly liberal leanings. His main interest appeared 
to lie in river�basin development, emphasizing huge dams. But it 
was hard to tell. Despite unquestioned administrative ability, he 
quickly lost interest in his new job and exerted little control over the 
4 
department. 
When Krug resigned in November 1949, Truman elevated 
Oscar Chapman from under secretary to secretary. Born in 
piedmont Virginia in 1896,  Chapman moved to Denver, Colorado, 
after World War I, where he became a protege of crusading juvenile 
judge Ben Lindsey and Senator Edward P. Costigan. Chapman had 
been a fervent supporter of Henry A. Wallace in 1944 but he had 
become a Truman yeoman by 1948 . Although he had carried out 
Ickes' programs enthusiastically, he had never imbibed the "old 
curmudgeon's" unifying view of society or combative crusading flair. 
He was by nature a conciliator and negotiator, and hence an·ideal 
exponent of broker-state liberalism. Heavily influenced by his 
environment, Chapman adhered to three of the characteristic themes 
of midcentury liberalism -- economic growth, integration, and 
national defense. He considered economic growth "the very essence 
of our development as a nation. " He actively tried to integrate 
minority groups into the national political and economic system, 
where they might have equal opportunity to compete in an expanding 
economy. And he backed the Truman administration's staunch 
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anticommunism stance, frequently emphasizing his department's 
role in building up American strength for the Cold War. Chapman 
and Krug did not enjoy the same rapport with Truman that Ickes 
had with Roosevelt, and Truman lacked the unifying view of his 
predecessor. But the secretaries tailored their programs to 
Truman's expectations, and differences between the president and 
the secretaries, particularly Chapman, were rare indeed. 5 
Interior Department activities fell under two broad 
headings, conservation and minority rights. I turn first to conserva­
tion, which had received a new impetus and comprehensivertess under 
the New Deal. The strongest case perhaps for continuity in 
conservation policy between the Roosevelt and Truman administrations 
lay in the effort to preserve a comprehensive federally centered 
program • .  The effort to assert federal authority over the oil-rich 
"tidelands" was representative. Ickes inaugurated the "tidelands11 
campaign in 1937, motivated by a desire to centralize natural­
:resources control and by suspicion of lax pro-business standards 
in state administration. The Supreme Court upheld federal 
jurisdiction, and Krug and Chapman staunchly rebuffed congressional 
attempts to "quitclaim " the "tidelands" to the states. Supported by 
the Eisenhower administration, the quitclaim 'effort succeeded in 
1953. While the 11tidelands11 issue has often seemed a fairly clear 
liberal-conservative split, there was also an important ·element of 
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continuity. Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations 
favored rapid exploitation of the resource, with little regard for 
environmental safeguards, Indeed Chapman, obsessed with the idea 
of providing more oil for national defense, attempted to start a 
"tidelands " drilling program for which he had no legal authority 
in 1951, and received sharp reprimands from members of Congress 
on both sides of the issue. 6 
The Truman-era department worked diligently to maintain 
its central role in public-power programs, which Ickes had greatly 
strengthened. Public power contributed to an economy of growth 
and particularly to what Chapman termed the "permanent upbuilding 
of the West. 1 1 The budget for dam construction in the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the department's chief power agency, climbed rapidly 
after the lean years of World War II, although it fell sharply during 
the Korean conflict. Chapman also attempted unsuccessfully to 
broaden Reclamation's sphere of activity with steam generating 
plants, and he battled a sometimes recalcitrant Congress to 
construct transmission lines to carry federally produced power 
directly to customers. But the Truman administration's public-
power record could match neither Roosevelt's nor Eisenhower's. 
The federal share of national electrical energy production sky­
rocketed from 1. 6 per cent in 1937 to 12. 6 per cent in 1945, then 
increased only slightly to 13. 2 per cent in 1952, before picking up 
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speed again to reach 17 . 1  per cent in 19 58. 7 
Repres entative of hi s broker approach, Chapman 
increasingly empha sized  the works themselve s to the diminution 
of the public policy they were to advance . As  a result his support 
of valley authoritie s ,  which embodied the regional-planning concept 
of which Roosevelt and Icke s were fond, suffered. Icke s had tried 
to swing Truman's support behind s even river -ba sin authoritie s ,  
which h e  had hoped, o f  cour s e, t o  locate in his department. Truman
leaned more toward indepehdent TV A- style organizations ;  but, 
more significantly, he advocated only one basin authority, "the 
Columbia Valley Authority, and never gave it more than half-hearted 
support . Krug worked hard for CV A. Chapman supported it at 
first, but by early 1950 he retreated to argue for building the dams 
first and then deciding on an administrative structure later. Truman' s  
and Chapman' s  lukewarm support for valley authoritie s reflected the 
growth strategy of the administration: increa s e  capacity and let 
di stribution take care of it self. 8 
In view of this approach it may not be surprising that the 
Truman- era department s lipped from the previous standard on a 
second group of cons ervation i s sue s ,  what might be termed 
"redi stributive" policie s .  The reversal could scarcel}'." have been 
more stark than in Krug and Chapman ' s  capitulation to the big 
grazing intere sts after Icke s' departure in 1946. During the war 
Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada had b egun working to relax the 
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minimal grazing regulations impo sed  under the T aylor Grazing Act 
of 19 34.  Chapman, then a s sistant s ecretary, denounced McCarran' s 
effort a s  1 1a part of the agrarian counter-revolution" typified by the
ema sculation of the Farm Security Administration. "It is  the 
organiz ed big men against the unorganized little men; the kulaks 
against the pea sant s ;  the haves  against the have -not s ,  1 1  Chapman 
told Icke s in 194 3 .  The s ecretary hired a new grazing director, who 
promptly announced he would triple fe e s ,  tighten regulations , and 
begin a range -rehabilitation program. 9 
When Krug became s ecretary he scuttled Icke s '  proposals  for 
a plan drawn up by R ex Nicholson, a California livestock operator. 
F e e s  should be bas e d  not on the value of the forag e  or on livestock 
price s ,  Nichol son argued, but solely on the cost of administration. 
He outlined in turn an undernourished grazing service of just 242
employees to police 140, 0 00 ,  0 0 0  acre s -- an area almo st half again 
a s  large as the State of California ; this minimal force made po s sible 
low fee s .  Grazing fee s were increased  from five cent s  per animal 
unit month to eight cents per a. u. m. , but two cents  per a. u. m. would 
go to range improvement s ,  s o  the actual co st to graziers wa s but 
six cent s per a. u. m.  ( Ba s ed on the value of th� forage  the fee  would 
have been about fourteen cents per a. u. m. ) Perhaps even worse ,  
Nicholson ignored the  increa sing importance of the  public domain
for wildlife, wilderness, watersheds, and recreation. lO 
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While congre s sional pr es sur e  in this situation had been
formidable,  the department had alternatives.  The Hou s e  Interior 
Appropriations Subcommittee was scandaliz ed by the low fee s ,  which 
it correctly pointed out repre sented a hidden sub sidy to the grazier s, 
and pre s s ed the department to boo st them sub stantially. Some 
influential western s enato r s ,  such as Carl Hatch of New Mexico 
and Carl Hayden of Arizona appar ently would have supported a fee of 
ten cent s .  Krug, however ,  acc epted the plan with only minor 
qualifications, and even allowed the live stock operato r s  to dictate 
the transfer of four officials out of the grazing s e rvice .  The fee s  
stayed at eight cents through 19 5 3 .  It wa s only under the Eis enhower 
administration that the ba sis  for calculating the fe e wa s  changed to 
r efle ct li�e stock pric e s  and gradually incr eas ed to 22 c ents by 19 5 9 .  ll 
Nor did the department seiz e the opportunity to s ide with the 
peasants  against the kulaks -- or, indeed,  the giant agribusines s  
combinations - - by enfor cing the r edistributive purpo s e  of 
r eclamation policy. The ba sic reclamation law of 19 02 r e stricted 
an individual landowner to r eceiving r eclamation water to irrigate 
only 16 0 acr e s .  The law r ecogniz e d  that the benefit s of publically 
funded project s should be distributed widely and should help 
primarily tho s e  at the bottom of the economic:. s cale. In·l947.MiChael 
Straus, commis s ioner of reclamation, induced the department 
solicitor to devise ingenious eva sions so that practically any size 
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holding could receive irrigation water . Krug and Chapman both 
gave lip s e rvice to the 16 0 -acre principle but did nothing to revoke 
Straus1s  subterfuge , which became a handy tool for the Eisenhower 
administration. Chapman in fact turned down an appeal from 
Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois thr ee days before  leaving office.  
11We certainly de s erved bette r  treatment from the avowed friend s 
of acreage limitation, " Dougla s sighed. Berkeley economist Paul 
S .  Taylor summarized the situation: Ickes  wa s " solid, 11 Krug was 
"almo st s _olid, " and Chapman "wobbled. 1112
A similar i s sue concerned fish trap s  in Ala ska . Big
Seattle -ba s ed food-pro c e s sing companie s owned 75 per cent of the 
large traps ,  which put small independent fishermen at a grave 
disadvantag e, drained pr e cious untaxed income out of the territory, 
and contributed to a serious depletion of the salmon fishery. Shortly 
befo r e  his r e signation Icke s announced hearings on regulations 
d e signed to sharply reduc e the numbe r  of trap s  an. individual or 
firm could employ. When the i s sue fell to Krug and Chapman, 
however ,  they tried to negotiate a compromis e  and then gave up the 
struggle entir ely. It was finally left for the State of Ala ska, onc e 
it had acquired statehood, to end the monopoly, by which time the 
salmon fishery had been s eriously depleted. 13 
On thre e  r epr e s entative redistribution i s sue s - - grazing, 
the 160-acre law, and the fishing monopoly -- the Department of 
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the faterio r  fell back from its earlier positions. If the "agrarian
counter r evolution" had started in Congre s s  during World War II, 
it gather ed force  when the executive branch thr ew· it s support on the 
s ide of the "have s "  against the "unorganized have -nots. 11 
The third c rucial a spect of cons ervation policy wa s the 
balance  betwe en con s ervation for u s e  and pr e s ervation, which came 
to be acutely thr eatened during the T ruman period. During World 
War II the principle of park inviolability had been maintained
de spite s erious thr eat s ,  most' notably the attempt to cut spruce in 
Olympic National Park; and, de spite heavy congr e s sional oppo sition, 
Roo s evelt and Ickes  had brought the beautiful Jackson Hole  country 
into the park system. After the war lumbermen again eyed Olympic, 
and in 1947 Krug and Chapman supported a lmnbermen1s bill to 
deplete some 56, 0 0 0  acr e s  of the spectacular rain for e st from
Olympic. When a public outcry erupted, the department rever sed 
it s elf and Olympic park r emained intact. 1
4 
Far mor e  s erious - - indeed, the grav e st threat ever to 
the integrity of the national parks - - wa s the Bureau of Reclamation 's  
propo sed  Echo Park Dam. A key structure in the Upper Colorado
Ba sin Program, the dam would inundate the spectacular canyons in 
the heart of Dino saur National Monument on the Colorado-Utah 
border. The Echo Park propo s al seemed especially sinister 
becau s e  dams were  on the drawing board s  for other national parks,
including Glacier,  Big Bend, Kings Canyon, and Grand Cauyon. 
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Chapman approved construction of the Echo Park dam, which enjoyed 
considerable support in the We st, on June 2 7, 195 0 ,  partly in the vain 
hope of insuring the re election of Utah Senator Elbert Thoma s. More 
broadly, Chapman argued that "the growth and development of the 
W e st depends upon the adoption of a s ound Upper Colorado Ba sin 
Program, and • • •  this i s  the mo st important consideration to be 
faced in this matter. 11 Trmnan di smi s s ed oppo sition to the dam by 
s aying : "It ha s alway s been my opinion that food for coming gener a ­
tions i s  much mor e  important than bone s o f  the Mesozoic period. 11 
But defense  may have overshadowed food. Chapman intimated strongly 
to some a s sociat e s  that he had approved the dam solely because  it 
would provide power for an atomic plant. Whether this wa s the r eal 
rea son is difficult to evaluate ,  but when pr e servationist group s  
mounted tr emendous p r e s sur e,  and when the atomic plant wa s 
located in Ohio, Chapman backed off. He did not dir ectly r ever se 
hims elf but called for studie s of alternative sit e s .  He failed t o  
endor s e  any and eventually gladly handed the i s sue t o  the R epublican 
administration, which also  pr e s sed for the Echo Park location 
before  eventually dropping it entirely. By initially agre eing to 
Echo Park Dam, Chapman demonstrated how economic growth and 
national defense weighted the conservation balance in favor of 
development over preservation. It was not surprising that the 
Trmnan administration, except for the brief John F. Kennedy
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r egime, wa s the only one between Grover Cleveland ' s  and Gerald 
Ford ' s that failed to e stablish a new national park. 1 5  
To summarize the Truman- e ra record o f  the Interior  
D epartment on con s ervation: The stronge st c a s e  for continuity with 
the Icke s -Roo s evelt re gime lay in pre serving c entralized federal 
control, although even her e  ther e  wa s some slippage in the r egional­
planning conc ept.  On r edistributive i s sue s the department slipped 
badly, and it raised an unpr ecedented thr eat to the con s ervation 
balance . 
The area in which one would expect the Interior Department 
of the T ruman year s to show the most advance s  over the New Deal 
era is minority right s .  The Roo s evelt admini stration's  achievements 
for minoritie s were spar s e, and the Truman regime boa sted the 
fir st civil-right s program. The T ruman administration ' s  goal, 
Donald R. McCoy and Richard T .  Ruetten have argued, was the 
integration of all minority groups into the mainstr eam of American 
life. Integration wa s a logical development in midcentury liberalism; 
it entailed e s s entially opening the system so  that individuals could 
compete on a ba sis  of equal opportunity in an expanding economy. 
For r ea son s of both politic s and principle, expanding minority rights 
s eemed mor e  urgent to the T ruman administration than to it s 
p r edecessor . But because of changing idea s of comm\:J.nity from 
the 19 3 0 s  and because of altered perceptions of national security, the 
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Interior Department unde r  T ruman left a mixed r ecord.  16  
I want to dis cu s s  minority right s under thr e e  heading s -­
black right s  in the District of Columbia, territorial administration, 
and Indian policy. The clea r e st departmental advance occur r ed 
somewhat surprisingly with black right s  in the District of Columbia. 
Under Harold Ickes  the Interior Departme;nt had e stabli shed probably 
a s  good a r ecord on black right s  a s  any agency during the FDR year s .  
But the department ' s actions had been limited largely t o  such thing s 
a s  hiring some blacks, integrating it s facilitie s, and staging some 
symbolic events such a s  the Marian Ander s on concert at the Lincoln 
Memorial. Trying to encourage home rule, the department had 
tried since 1942 to transfer r ecreational facilitie s to a district 
board ;  but when the local organization r efused to operate integrated 
swimming pools,  the department kept it s pools  under  it s jurisdiction. 
Chapman initiated a special training pro gram for pool per sonnel and 
in the summer of 19 50  overrode inten s e  local oppo sition to open the 
pool s, integrated. The s ea s on ran smoothly and provided an 
impo rtant early demonstration of suc c e s sful integration. 17 
The department was also one of the mo st consistent 
proponent s and supporters of the Justice Department ' s characteristic 
amicus curiae briefs. Chapman appear s to have been particularly 
influential in per suading Solicitor General Philip Perlman to carry 
an appeal testing the validity of some unenforced laws passed by the 
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Di strict of  Columbia government during Reconstruction that outlawed 
s egregation in public plac e s .  Perlman' s intervention, carried to 
fruition by the Eisenhower administration, culminated in a vindica-
tion of the law s and marked a major step in dismantling s e gregation 
in the district. Krug and Chapman also supported sundry other
civil -right s ca s e s, including oppo sition to re stricted housing 
covenant s and di scrirnina.tion against Indian voting and Social Security 
right s .  With black :rights the Truman-period department expanded
h R lt f , JS t e oo s eve - era ounu2.i1on; 
A second area , in which the department had primary
re sponsibility, conc erned territ:E·Ld people s. G eorge Kennan 
expre s s ed the colonial dilemma ]'.>Ointedly: "A king can have 
subject s; it i s  a que stion whether a republic can. 11 Territorial 
admini stration began to improve under Icke s ,  who appear s to have 
favored extending more right s to territorial peoples;  except for 
beginning a step -by- step proce s s  to extend more s elf-government 
to Puerto Rico,  however, his administration recorded few concrete 
measures. Af'ter the war the dynamic s of anticoloniali sm demanded 
more right s and more s elf-government for United State s territorie s, 
but changing perception s  of national s ecurity undercut the department ' s  
initiative s. 19 
The Interior D epartrnent provided indispensable leadership 
in pushing through three adin.inistration civil-rights measures for 
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Puerto Rico .  Truman appointed the first native governor, J e sus 
Pinero, in 1946 . A year later Congre s s  gave Puerto Ricans the 
right to elect their own governor, making the i sland the only United
Stat e s  territory to enjoy that measure of s elf-government. The 
vexing status que stion wa s temporarily resolved when Congre s s  
created the commonwealth in 19 50, The Truman administration 
had extended more s elf -government to Puerto Rico than had all of 
the administrations from 1898  to 1945  to all of the po s s e s sions 
combined. The commonwealth compromis e  benefitted from a broad 
consensus that made it scarc ely a liberal-cons ervative is sue at all,
and it received overwhelming support at the time from the Puerto 
Ricans . Yet the nature of the compromis e ,  which reflected the 
United States '  desire to maintain the strate gic island within the 
American defense  system but with something le s s  than full 
a s sociation, proved ultimately incapable of re s olving the status 
. 20 que stion. 
The liberal-cons ervative con sensus did not extend to the 
i s sue of statehood for Ala ska and Hawaii. The Interior Department 
worked enthusia stically for statehood, e specially for Alaska, and 
came clo s e  to pushing it through Congre s s  in 19 5 0  before the 
Korean War froze the bud . The department ' s  support helped lay 
the ground for statehood for both territories, but statehood had to 
await Eisenhower 's s econd term. 21 
Interior - 17 
The little po s s e s sions in the Pacific provided perhap s the 
clearest c a s e  of the administration ' s  attitude towards territorial 
peoples ,  for policy ther e  wa s determined chiefly by the executive 
branch. Icke s, Krug, and Chapman r e solutely insisted the Pacific 
islands should come under civilian, not military, governance. As  
Krug put it in 1947 :  American territorial government in  the Pacific
wa s a form "we would not tolerate on the mainland and would 
probably criticize if it existed under  a foreign regime.  11 Guam and
American Samoa had been ruled by nearly absolute Navy governo r s  
under a one - s entence  executive order is sued b y  William McKinley 
in 1899 .  When the United State s wr ested the Microne sian mandate s  
from Japan at the end o f  the war ,  the military in sisted o n  controlling 
the islands " s o  that we can project our own offensive force s  against 
the Asiatic mainland . 1 1  The Joint Chiefs of Staff insi sted on United 
State s control of the i sland string from Hawaii to the Mariana s - -
within 2000 mile s of th.e A sian coast  - - which Secretary of Defens e  
Jame s Forrestal liked to call "the near Pacific . 11 Icke s argued at 
a cabinet meeting in January 194 5  that the islands should be placed 
under  United Nations trustee ship and administered by a civilian 
agency, pr e sumably his Department of the Interior. Forre stal 
r etorted with the sugge stion that "Mr .  Icke s be made King of 
Polynesia, Micronesia, and the Pacific Ocean Area. 1 1  After two 
year s of delay the military finally agreed in 1947 t o  eventual
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civilian rule .  "They squawked and cr eaked, particularly Forre stal, 11
said Krug, "but [ Secr etary of State George ] Mar shall s eemed to 
think it wa s  a sound thing to do . 1 1  Truman, in turn, committed his
administration to implementing in the Pacific "tho se  fundamental 
human rights and that democ ratic form of government which are the 
rich heritage of the people of the United State s .  
n2 2  
The military continued to seize eve ry excus e  for delaying 
the tran sfer to civilians, and once the tran sfer took place ,  civilian 
practic e r�ised the que stion whether it was worth the effort to achieve. 
Guam, the mo st populous and mo st Americanized of the islands ,  came 
under civilian governnient on August 1, 19 50, and Congre s s  pa s sed an 
or ganic act extending some provision s of the Bill of Rights  to
Guamanian s .  Acts of the unicameral legislature r emained subject t o
the veto o f  the appointed governor or the pre sident, and Guamanian s 
failed to s ecure badly needed preference in land holding to protect
them from the formidable out side financial pr e s sur e .  The Interior 
Department a s  sured the Navy that s ecurity regulations  would be no 
le s s  string ent than before .  The civilians proved true to  their word:  
Aliens without s ecurity clearan c e s  were deported, and American 
citizens who lacked Navy clearance s  - - one of whom wa s former 
S enator Glen Taylor, Henry Wallace' s running mate in 1948 - - were
d . d 
23 
enie entry. 
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American Samoa, in which traditional, nonindividualistic 
cultur e  wa s stronger,  came under civilian rule on July 1, 1951, 
Samoan s blocked pa s sage of a propo s ed organic act becau s e  it s 
forms of goverr.Jnent threatened the e stablished social structure and 
because  of the lack of safeguard s  for Samoan landholding. (A Samoan 
constitution wa s finally promulgated by Secr etary of the Interior 
Fr ed Seaton in 1960 and included the land safeguards . ) The fir st two 
civilian governor s s erved le s s  than a year apiece and needle s sly 
offended Samoan patriarchs; <'.:ongr e s s  cut appropriations from the 
level they had r eached under the Navy; and Secretary Chapman, 
to the extent that he had a policy, encourag ed a s similation and 
impo sition of rnainland political forms instead of pre serving 
2 4 Samoan culture. 
The Interior Departrn.ent1 s insi stence on civilian government 
for Microne sia finally bor e  fruit on July 1, 1951. Four year s earlier  
the United State s  had worked out a unique arrangement with the 
United Nation s to make Microne sia a strategic trustee ship, the only 
such hybrid in existenc e ;  the very concept wa s a contradiction in 
term s .  Truman gave the U N  his ''solemn a s surance" that 
Microne sians would receive "a full mea sur e of individual rights and 
libertie s .  11 But Mar shall came closer  to the meaning of strategic 
trustee ship when he told Congr e s s  in 1947: "W e must observe
c e rtain forms,, but we have • , • almo st complete  liberty of  action. n 
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The only change Interior Department administration brought t o  the 
Trust T erritory was a high commis sioner,  who did not even reside 
in the territory; the Microne sians rec eived no additional right s and 
no forms of s elf-government .  Security r e strictions wer e  even 
more stringent than on neighboring Guam, as Microne sia. r emained 
off-limit s to mo st Americans throughout the 1950 s .  A s  his final 
important act of territorial policy, Truman overrode Interior  
Department objections and on  January 1, 19 5 3 ,  transferred  two of  
the Marianas ,  Saipan and Tinian, back to  Navy control. Tho s e  two 
i slands thus achieved the distinction of being the only area s under  
United State s  administration eve r  to revert to  military rule after 
h . . d . 'l 25 avmg enJoye civ1 governance .  
Midc entury liberalism r eached distinct limits i n  the 
territorie s ,  and for a predictable reason: exaggerated idea s of 
national s ecurity requir ement s  undercut the promised bestowal of 
ba sic right s, The Department of the Interior displayed the b e st 
record in the executive branch on territorial matter s ,  but the 
department's stance wa s s eriously flawed by it s none -too-reluctant 
acquiescence in s ecurity r e strictions, Comparison with the 
Roo s evelt admini stration on the territorie s is  somewhat difficult 
becaus e  it s succ e s sor faced a different s ituation, but Icke s 1 firm 
stanc e sugge sts he would have fought the defens e  e stablishment mor e  
tenaciously than his conciliatory succ e s s or s .  Overall on territorial 
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policy, the achievements of Krug and Chapman stem directly from 
the foundation laid directly by their predecessor, and their reversals 
had no precedent in pre -1946 administration,
The most direct and most dramatic instance of the Fair 
Deal reversing the New Deal occurred in the third and most important 
area of minority rights, Indian policy. Under Commis sioner of 
Indian Affairs John Collier and Secretary Ickes the Indian New 
Deal had rejected the c enturies -old policy of a s similation in favor of 
Indian identity and community.. The Indian land ba s e  was stabilized, 
some measure of Indian self-government wa s introduced, and· Indian 
culture rec eived a newly positive empha sis,  The Indian New Deal 
helped make the 19 3 0s, said Vine Deloria Jr. , "the greatest days 
of Indian life in the twentieth century. " The Indian N ew Deal 
suffered badly during World War II, and in the late 1940 s policy
began to drift back toward s a s similation . 26
The  outright reversal b egan in 1950 . Chapman argued that 
the Indians should be "intermingled gradually and mixed with our 
people"; later he called for a "full -scale drive " for the "complete 
independenc e of the Indian people .  1 1  His choice for commissioner 
of Indian affairs wa s Dillon S. Myer, former dire ctor of the War 
Relocation Authority, who implement ed what he termed "withdrawal 
programming. " Myer 1 s theory was that Indians would eventually 
c ea s e  to exist a s  a s eparate people and henc e should be integrated 
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into the main stream of American life , in ke eping with the civil-rights 
emphasis of the Truman administration. The Myer - Chapman regime 
planned to end the special status of the Indians and gradually withdraw 
Bureau of Indian Affair s s ervic e s, They encouraged Indians to leave 
their communities for the cities, ended effort s to pre s erve Indian 
culture , phased out special Indian school s ,  and abandoned the fight 
to preserve Indian lands. In one of his most sinister mov e s  Myer, 
with mixed support from Chapman, attempted to a s s ert his control 
over attorneys hired by the Indians .  Myer acknowledged  that Indian 
opposition to his program wa s "nearly unanimous ,  11 but he persisted 
in carrying it out regardless of Indian cons ent .  The Truman 
administration ' s  "withdrawal programming" was in all e s s ential 
r e spect s  the same a s  the Eisenhower administration's dis a strous 
"t ermination" policy. 
27 
To summariz e  the Truman- era Interior Department's 
record on minority rights: The department significantly expanded 
on it s pr edece ssor's foundation for black rights in the District of
Columbia, it l eft a contradictory record in the territorie s ,  and it 
implemented a whole s ale rever sal of the Indian New Deal .  
In conclusion I want to pos e  two questions .  First, how doe s
the overall record of the Interior Department from 1946 through 1952 
compare with the previous twelve years? The Truman- era department 
preserved some of the New Deal programs and in a few cases 
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e:i.7anded on the New Deal foundation . But in a number of important 
cas e s  the New Deal programs suffered s evere slippage and even 
outright abandonment. The department displayed little of the vision 
and innovative spirit of the period 19 33 through 1945 .  The record of 
Krug and Chapman dismayed Icke s and some of his former officials, 
such as John Collier ;  the former secretary was particularly distr e ssed 
by Chapman ' s stand on Indians and.pre s ervation. This i s  not to
sugge st that the department under Icke s achieved complete suc ce s s , 
t. 
simply that it generally move� in the right direction and attained a 
certain minimum standard. It may have been politically po s sible to 
' 
achieve mor e in the 1930.  But after World War II the slippage often
could be trac ed not to public indiffer enc e or congre s sional pr e s sure 
but to executive decision. In some cas e s  it was congre s sional
pressure and public outcry that pre s sur ed the executive to live up 
to the pr evious standard.  The d epartment not mer ely inherited 
dome stic deadlock but contributed to it s own decline. The Interior
Department in 1952 mor e  nearly r e s embled that of the Eis enhower
28 years than of the New D eal era.
Second, what doe s  the Interior D epartment sugge st about 
midcentury liberalism? Much mor e work need s to be done, but 
ther e are clue s that the department's decline wa s not isolated.  
Trwnan' s appointment o f  conservative secretaries like John Snyder 
at the T rea sury and Charles  Sawyer at Commerce make tho s e  
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departments unlikely r epositorie s of liberali sm. The Truma
n housing
program, one of the Fair Deal' s chief legislative victori e s
, cater ed
to the construction and real - e state lobbie s .  Other ag encies
 which
dealt with public power, the Department of Agricultur e and 
the Army
Corps of Engine er s, had weaker record s than the D epartme
nt of the
Interior. Antitrust activity, confused  under  the New Deal
, wa s minimal
under the Fair Deal, a s  wer e  any redistributive tax policie s .  
Thu s  the
verdict on midc entury liberalism sugg e st s  that, both in term
s of the
standard that liberalism had attained earlier and of the new ch
allenges
it faced, the Trwnan era r epr e s ented libe rali sm in r etre at.  
29 
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The Crucial D ecade - - and After: America, 1945 -19 6 0  (New Y ork, 
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3 .  Richardson, Dam s ,  Park s & Politic s ,  ch. l; Graham,
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B. Nixon, ed. , Franklin D. Roosevelt & Cons ervation, 1911-1945
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Warner W. Gardner oral history, Har ry S. Truman Library 
(her eaft e r  HSTL) , Independenc e ,  Mo. , p. 3 0 ;  author ' s  interview 
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Chapman telephone conver sations with Jame s McGranery, June 6 ,  
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Interior - 29 
that would have deregulated natural ga s .  ( Chapman to Frank Pace ,  
April 6 ,  1950 , box 2 2 ,  Chapman Office Files , Records  of  the 
Secr etary of the Interior ,  Record Group 48 , National Archive s ;  
Hamby, Beyond the New Deal , pp. 346-348 . ) In a demonstration
of the growing con s ervati sm of midcentury regulatory commi s sions, 
the F ederal Power Commis sion in 19 51 r enounced it s authority to  
r egulate certain ga s companie s ,  but in 1954 the Supr eme C ourt 
ordered the FPC to rea sswne the power (Na sh, United State s  Oil
Policy, pp . 2 34-2 35). 
7. Quotation from Chapman to Icke s ,  Oct.  13 , 1943 � ,  box
6 7 ,  Chapman Paper s ,  HSTL; Philip J. Funigiello , T oward a National 
Power Policy: The New Deal and the Electric Utility Industry, 
19 3 3-1941 (Pitt sburgh, 197 3) , ch. 7-9 ; Minut e s ,  Confer enc e of 
Secr etarie s ,  Aug . 3 0 ,  1951, box 5 8 ;  John R.  Waltrip,  "Public 
Power During the Truman Administration" (unpub. Ph. D.  dis s . , 
Univ. of Mi s souri, 1965) , pp. 95-9 8 ;  Phyllis R. De  Luna, "Public 
V e r sus Private Power During the Truman Administration: A 
Study of Fair Deal Liberalism" (unpub . Ph. D. di s s . , Univ. of 
Alberta, 1974), pp. 547 - 5 81;  Electrical World,  CXLI (Jan. 25 ,  1954), 
16 7 ,  CLII  (F eb. 2 9 ,  196 0 ) ,  81, CLVII (Feb. 2 6 , 1962 ) ,  59 . Public 
power i s  fr equently cited as one of the " substantial" Fair Deal 
legislative accomplishments (see for instanc e  Hamby, Beyond the
New Deal, p. 515, and Leuchtenburg, "A Troubled F ea st, 11 p. 673).
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